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This paper discusses both the potential contribution that trade policy initiatives can make 
towards the achievement of significant global carbon emissions reduction and the potential 
impacts of proposals now circulating for carbon reduction motivated geographical trade 
arrangements, including carbon free trade areas. We first suggest that trade policy is likely to 
be a relatively minor consideration in climate change containment. The dominant influence 
on carbon emissions globally for next several decades will be growth more so than trade and 
its composition, and in turn, the size of trade seemingly matters more than its composition 
given differences in emission intensity between tradables and nontradables.  We also note 
that differences in emissions intensity across countries are larger than across products or 
sectors and so issues of country discrimination in trade policy (and violations of MFN) arises.     
We next discuss both unilateral and regional carbon motivated trade policy arrangements, 
including three potential variants of carbon emission reduction based free trade area 
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arrangements. One is regional trade agreements with varying types of trade preferences 
towards low carbon intensive products, low carbon new technologies and inputs to low 
carbon processes. A second is the use of joint border measures against third parties to 
counteract anti-competitive effects from groups of countries taking on deeper emission 
reduction commitments. A third is third country trade barriers along with free trade or other 
regional trade agreements as penalty mechanisms to pressure other countries to join emission 
reducing environmental agreements. We differentiate among the objectives, forms and 
possible impacts of each variant. We also speculate as to how the world trading system may 
evolve in the next few decades as trade policy potentially becomes increasingly dominated by 
environmental concerns. We suggest that  the future evolution of the trading system will 
likely be with environmentally motivated arrangements acting as an overlay on prevailing 
trade and financial arrangements in the WTO and IMF, and eventually movement to linked 
global trade and environmental policy bargaining.   
 
1. Introduction 
This paper discusses both the potential contribution that trade policy can make towards 
significant global carbon emissions reduction and the potential impacts of proposals for both 
unilateral and regional carbon emission reduction motivated trade policy arrangements now 
circulating, including carbon free trade areas proposals.   
The background to our discussion is the present global negotiating situation regarding 
global carbon emissions reduction initiatives, both in the Bali /post Kyoto UNFCCC 
negotiating process (out to Copenhagen 2009 and beyond), and also in  debate on possible 
unilateral measures by various entities around the world (and especially in the EU). In Europe 
the view is that individual countries (or a group of countries )going faster and father than 
other countries in terms of emissions reduction commitments inevitably face issues of linkage 
to the trade regime if offsets are to be provided to anti-competitive effects on domestic 
producers within countries flowing from environmental commitments.   
The combination of the Post Bali road map discussion following the recent UNFCCC 
Bali Meeting (Dec 2007) and the EU commitments in their 2020 programme (20% emissions 
reductions by 2020, and 20% use of renewables by the same date) has lead to increased 
discussion as to how trade and environment regimes may need to be more closely linked in a 
post Kyoto world. The future, as seen in Europe, is for Europe to lead the world with deeper 
emissions reduction commitments than elsewhere. But while others lag new trade measures 
may be needed. Such measures may well eventually involve fellow travelers in new carbon 
driven regional trade arrangements.   
We first highlight the seemingly much larger role to be played by economic growth rather 
than trade in fuelling growing carbon emissions and whose containment is more likely to 
significantly reduce emissions than trade policy interventions. We also suggest that since 
much of global merchandise trade is in emissions intensive manufactures, the more critical  
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issue may be the level of trade relative to non-traded services than the product and country 
composition of trade, which trade policy proposals largely address. Having said this, however, 
we also note the large differences in emissions intensities across countries and hence the 
potential role for (non-MFN) country discrimination in trade policy. 
We suggest that discussion of unilateral carbon motivated border measures and carbon 
motivated regional trade arrangements is likely to grow in significance as global negotiations 
on climate change intensify. This will occur especially as the impacts of such initiatives on 
the size and pattern of trade become more apparent, and trade measures to support climate 
change initiatives are explored. Unilateral carbon motivated border measures could involve 
either or both of tariffs on high carbon imports and subsidies on low carbon exports.     
 At a trade policy level, we also discuss emerging ideas and proposals for carbon 
emission reduction motivated free trade areas, and accompanying border measures when 
carbon reduction initiatives are implemented. We differentiate both objective and form in 
such proposals, emphasizing how such measures can in some cases serve to increase rather 
than reduce carbon emissions.   
 In their simplest form, carbon free trade areas would involve free trade in low carbon 
containing products among countries jointly committing to significant emissions reductions 
or renewable commitments, and also with external trade barriers against third countries that 
do not follow. Discussion of both their form and impact is related to the long studied customs 
union issue originally analyzed by Viner(1950), but now the impacts of carbon 
pricing/reduction policies on emissions is the focus. 
We discuss three different forms of possible trade arrangements. One is regional trade 
agreements with varying types of trade preferences towards low carbon intensive products, 
low carbon new technologies and inputs to low carbon processes to stimulate trade (and 
hence consumption) in low carbon intensive products, and in this way are designed to 
contribute directly to emissions reduction through changed trade patterns. A weakness of this 
approach is that seemingly there is more differentiation in emissions intensity by country than 
by product. Also, this discussion does not focus on the external trade arrangements of the 
group of countries entering into such an agreement. 
A second type focuses on the anti-competitive effects on domestic producers when 
significant joint emissions reduction commitments are made which others do not follow. Such 
commitments raise costs for domestic producers and whether there should be offsets for these 
relative cost effects compared to third country producers operating outside of such 
arrangements is an issue, as well as the form they should take. This perceived need for border 
tax adjustment has already arisen in Europe (see Lockwood &Whalley (2008)). 
Hence, if various entities within the OECD, such as, the US and the EU were to jointly 
agree on carbon emission reduction initiatives, some forms of joint border measures against 
third parties might be used to counteract the anti-competitive effects on domestic producers 
from the joint environmental commitment. These could take the form of common or country  
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differentiated external barriers against third parties. 
A third type of arrangement could be where countries enter into free trade or other 
regional trade agreements and use joint and discriminatory carbon motivated trade barriers 
against third parties as a way of pressuring countries to join their joint environmental 
agreement. This form of trade arrangement is similar to that contained in the Montreal 
Protocol of 1987. 
We discuss what may be involved in each of these, and also in the wider use of trade 
policies to achieve global carbon limitation objectives.    We note in passing that similar ideas 
to those now surrounding carbon motivated trade policies could be discussed for a wide range 
of policy related areas and their interaction with trade, quite besides climate change. Joint or 
unilateral trade policies could be argued for countries with, say, a high level of provision of 
social programs, high labor standards, high minimum wages and other policy features. We 
thus suggest, including in the carbon emissions case, that the motivation for these types of 
trade arrangements and their forms and impacts should be discussed as separate issues. 
We also discuss the potential systemic impacts of such arrangements and how the world 
trading system may evolve in the next few decades in light of the likely growing interface 
between trade and environmental policies. International agreements are critical for countries 
whose policy objectives are to avoid destructive policy retaliation and gain common benefits 
from cooperation. We suggest that the Bretton Woods 1944 Conference yielded a global trade 
and monetary order whose main aim was to rebuild the international economy after World 
War II, but the resulting system only focused on trade and finance, not physical interactions 
between countries. Today, given concerns over global warming, the future evolution of the 
trading system may well be that environmentally motivated arrangements act as an overlay 
prevailing trade and financial arrangements in the WTO and the IMF. The world of global 
policy coordination may thus move beyond WTO trade negotiations to linked trade and 
environmental policy bargaining. 
 
2. Carbon and Trade   
   The central issue this paper discusses is the use of trade policy either unilaterally or 
through international coordination as an instrument for achieving significant reductions in 
carbon emissions. We also discuss the potential use of carbon-linked trade policies by 
countries. A number of broad ranging issues have to be addressed first before specific carbon 
motivated trade policy interventions can be discussed.   
First is the general issue of linkage between trade on one hand and carbon emissions on 
the other. Negotiated carbon emissions reductions seek to address the lack of internalization 
of global externalities assorted with emissions and climate change. Whether or not and how 
trade policies can be productively used as for the supportive internalization mechanisms and 
whether  they are effective or other instruments are more appropriate to use in achieving 
internalization objectives is the follow on issue.    
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At first sight, the uses of trade policy for these purposes would only seem indirect, and 
even clumsy, since it is economic growth more so than trade and its composition that 
seemingly fuels growing emissions. Recognition of the political pressures to use trade policy 
to compensate loses and effectively operates as a system of supporting side payments to new 
arrangements as part of carbon policy regimes seems more comprehensible. Whether trade 
policies can be effectively used as penalty or enforcement mechanisms to achieve and 
underpin environment cooperation is a further issue. This bears on the border tax adjustment 
and external trade barrier issues for regional agreements which we touch on later in the paper. 
On casual inspection, trade policy as a mechanism to reduce carbon emissions would 
seem to be an ineffective tool and only offer quantitatively small and indirect effects. This is 
principally because the largest contributor to the growth of carbon emissions over the next 30 
to 40 years will almost certainly be economic growth rather than the growth of trade. China 
has been growing at approximately 10-11% a year. Real income per capita in China has 
increased by a factor of 8 since 1978. If this growth rate prevails out to 2050, real income per 
capita in China will increase by a factor of 30 between 2000 and 2050. This growth will 
inevitably generate large increases in carbon emissions, and quantitatively, the effect of 
growth would seem to swamp by many orders of magnitude anything which may be achieved 
by the use of trade policies. As such, compared to reductions in the size of the national 
economies by constraints imposed on growth, trade policies would seemingly only offer 
second order effects.   
In addition, since much of international trade in industrial products is in manufactures 
and because manufactures are relatively carbon intensive compared to services and 
non-manufactures, the size of trade relative to non-trade activity seems more important than 
the product composition of trade which trade policies may influence. In OECD economies, 
around 70% of national income originates in service-related activities, and manufacturing 
activity in terms of value added is only a small portion of GDP, in the range 15-25%. If trade 
policy interventions are largely focused on changing the composition of trade ,then this 
would seem to be a third order effect on carbon emissions relative to the two bigger effects of   
growth and the relative size of trade and    non-trade activities.   
But the ways in which trade policy interventions can affect carbon emissions are a little 
more subtle .An important consideration is that there are large differences in emissions 
intensity of production by country. This especially the case when comparing high and low 
wage economies, such as China and the OECD.  Indeed, one can persuasively argue that 
differences in emissions intensity are larger across countries than they are across products or 
sectors.  
In Table 1, we report data on carbon emissions intensity by product by country reported 
by Ahmad & Wyckoff (2003). These data clearly show large differences in emissions 
intensity across countries, and suggest that for certain pairs of countries, differences in 
emissions intensity across countries are larger than across products or sectors. China, in  
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particular, exhibits sharply higher emissions intensities than in OECD countries.     
And even within countries, there are large variations in emissions intensity depending 
upon location. In some countries (China is such a case), there can be small localized high 
emitting power plants which are used for  electricity generation, and relocation of 
production from one region of a country to another can also generate significant reductions in 
emissions. It is thus unclear whether trade policy interventions should be more focused on 
discrimination across and within countries rather than discrimination across products.   
There are also other trade policy effects to be taken into account. One is on relocation of 
production and on component slices of larger production chains more so than on individual 
product production. It is now common in some countries to use R&D tax credits focused on 
particular component of activities, such as design and product innovation, rather than the 
whole production process to induce production mobility. Mobility effects stemming from 
both different emissions reductions intensities by country and carbon motivated trade policy 
intervention thus also come into play.   
At a crude level, therefore, the intuition would seem to be that trade policies which 
affect the composition of trade may only provide a third order effect on the overall level of  
carbon emissions. But, a more nuanced approach to trade policy which goes beyond 
conventional product based differentiation in trade policy, and focuses on country or region 
within country differentiation may have larger effects. 
 Policies which focus on differences in emissions intensities of production for similar 
products across countries, and even differences in emissions intensity across locations within 
countries seemingly also suggest a sharply different form of trade policy intervention than in 
conventional trade policy discussions. This is because if there are un-internalized externalities, 
the degree of internalization that might be sought through trade policies will be a function of 
the relative differences in emissions, as well as the overall size of the emissions involved. If 
emissions intensities are higher in one country than in another (as in the case of China and the 
OECD), then the argument would be that trade policy should sharply discriminate by country 
more so than by product, with higher barriers against those countries which are the source of 
high emissions. This direction for policy is obviously in sharp conflict with 
non-discrimination in the WTO. 
This discussion also has the implication that if trade policies to support efforts to achieve 
carbon emissions reduction targets are to be used in a discriminatory manor to achieve 
internalization of externalities, then the discrimination should be targeted directly towards the 
largest differences in emissions intensity. Discrimination in trade policies will presumably by 
product and country, and the data we present above suggest that country discrimination will 
quantatively dominate product discrimination.   
This also suggests that in any regional trade agreements scheming to achieve emissions 
reductions, discrimination should be targeted in a combined border based system reflecting 
differential emissions intensities across supplying countries. If one region with a range of  
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higher emissions intensities by product trades with other region with a range of low 
emissions intensities, and all in the region take on significant carbon emissions commitments, 
rather than having common external trade barriers against non-participants, and zero barriers 
within the region, they should use a gradation of third country barriers. There would be both 
in region and across third country barriers which are more preferential within the region and 
less preferential outside the region, with discrimination among suppliers to the region from 
outside. Thus, in the carbon case, what is at issue are not common external trade barriers 
against third parties, and zero barriers within regions, as in conventional customs union and 
free trade area literature , but different gradations of barriers within and without which focus 
on correction for differential severity of externality inflicted damage through trade measures.  
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Table 1: Emission Intensity by Country by Product – Embodied (Direct + Indirect) CO2 Emissions   
per US Dollar of GDP by Country by Industry –Kg CO2 per US Dollar of GDP (1995) 
INDUSTRY  AUSTR-





LIND FRANCE GER- 
MANY  GREECE HUN 
-GARY  ITALY JAPAN KOREA 
Agriculture, etc.  0.6 0.7 1.5  0.6  0.4  0.2 0.3 0.5 0.9  0.3  0.3  0.4 
Mining, Extraction, 
Refining  1.0 1.8 2.1  1.0  1.5  1.0 1.1 1.9 3.1  0.6  0.9  1.1 
Food, Beverages, 
Tobacco  0.6 0.4 1.3  0.5  0.5  0.2 0.3 0.5 0.9  0.3  0.2  0.4 
Textiles, Leather, 
Footwear  0.5 0.3 1.3  0.4  0.4  0.2 0.4 0.5 0.7  0.3  0.2  0.6 
Wood, Products   
of wood, & Cork  0.5 0.5 1.3  0.3  0.5  0.2 0.2 0.7 0.9  0.2  0.2  0.5 
Pulp, Paper Printing, 
 and  Publishing  0.5 0.8 1.5  0.2  0.7  0.2 0.3 0.8 0.8  0.3  0.2  0.6 
Chemicals  1.0 1.6 2.2  0.4  0.9  0.5 0.6 0.9 1.8  0.7  0.5  1.3 
Other Non-Metallic   
Mineral   1.6 1.2 3.2  1.1  1.7  0.6 0.7 4.3 2.7  0.8  0.6  1.5 
Iron & Steel  2.3 1.6 4.1  0.8  2.1  1.5 1.1 2.9 3.0  0.9  0.9  1.2 
Non-Ferrous Metals  3.0 n/a 2.0  0.3  1.0  0.5 n/a n/a n/a  n/a  0.7  1.5 
Other Metal Products, 
Machinery Eqpt  0.7 0.5 1.5  0.3  0.3  0.2 0.3 1.4 0.5  0.3  0.1  0.4 
Motor Vehicles, Trains, 
Ships Planes.  0.6 0.7 1.3  0.4  0.4  0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4  0.3  0.3  0.5 
Other Manufacturing   
& Recycling  0.5  0.7  n/a 0.3  0.4 0.3  0.3  1.0  0.7 0.3  0.2 0.8 
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SPAIN SWEDEN UK US BRAZIL INDIA CHINA RUSSIA
Agriculture, etc.  0.7   0.2  0.5   1.9  0.3  0.4   0.3  0.5  0.3   0.7 1.3  1.9 
Mining, Extraction, 
Refining  1.2   0.9  0.5   3.0  1.6  1.0   0.9  1.9  0.7   2.9 4.5  1.5 
Food, Beverages, Tobacco  0.4   0.2  0.3   1.7  0.4  0.4   0.4  0.5  0.3   1.2 1.8  1.7 
Textiles, Leather, 
Footwear  0.3   0.3  0.2   1.6  0.4  0.3   0.4  0.5  0.2   2.2 1.7  n/a 
Wood, Products   
of wood, & Cork  0.2   0.2  0.3   2.2  0.3  0.4   0.3  0.5  0.2   1.0 2.5  3.0 
Pulp, Paper Printing, 
 and  Publishing  0.2   0.2  0.2   1.8  0.4  0.7   0.3  0.4  0.4   3.1 3.0  n/a 
Chemicals  0.8   1.3  0.6   3.2  0.8  0.8   0.7  1.0  0.7   3.9 4.9  6.6 
Other Non-Metallic   
Mineral   0.6   0.2  0.8   4.4  1.0  0.7   0.7  1.3  1.0   6.9 6.1  5.8 
Iron & Steel  1.4   1.5  2.3   5.1  1.1  0.8   1.6  1.6  1.7   9.2 9.2  10.1 
Non-Ferrous Metals  n/a    n/a  0.6   n/a  n/a  n/a )   0.8 0.9  1.0   3.2 4.9  2.9 
Other Metal Products, 
Machinery Eqpt  0.3   0.4  0.3   2.2  0.4  0.4   0.4  0.4  0.4   3.4 2.9  3.4 
Motor Vehicles, Trains, 
Ships Planes.  0.3   0.3  0.3   2.0  0.4  0.3   0.3  0.4  0.4   4.9 3.0  n/a 
Other Manufacturing   
& Recycling  0.3   1.0  0.2   1.6  0.4  0.4   0.4  0.3  0.3   4.3 2.4  2.2 
Electricity, Gas, Water  3.2   0.9  0.1   18.0  3.1  1.3   4.1  6.8  0.4   21.0 24.2  19.4 
 
Source: Ahmad N. and A. Wyckoff (2003), “Carbon Dioxide Emissions Embodied in International Trade of Goods”, 
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3. Possible Carbon Motivated Regional Trade Agreements 
The uses of trade policies to support emissions reduction initiatives cover not only unilateral 
actions individually by countries, but also joint actions by groups of countries. Such 
arrangements typically centre on three distinct forms, each reflecting different objectives for 
trade policies. One involves lowering trade barriers on both low carbon products and products 
central to low carbon new technologies as well as products that are inputs to low carbon 
processes. The aim is to change the composition of trade in ways which lower global carbon 
emissions. Here given differences in emissions intensities by country, country discrimination 
may also enter. 
Another use of trade policies is as a protective device to provide offsets to domestic 
producers adversely affected relative to foreign competition by the cost implications of own 
country emissions reduction initiatives. A third uses trade policies as a sanctioning mechanism 
against other countries in an effort to force them to adopt emission reduction initiatives 
comparable to own country or within group actions. The last of these is typically to be 
employed by a sub group of countries rather than on a single country basis. 
As far as own country actions are involved two issues arise. The first is the potential 
effectiveness of new trade policy preferences towards low carbon products. If these were 
designed to be WTO compatible they would involve product selective non discriminatory 
reductions in tariff rates among partners to agreements, more so than tariff rate increases. Here 
the key determinations of effectiveness are the preexisting dispersion in tariff rates across the 
high-low carbon divide, and the differences in carbon intensity by product or sector. 
The WTO compatibility of such arrangements raises two key issues. The first is that they 
would need to be non discriminatory, and selective actions against high emitting countries 
would be ruled out. The second concerns WTO provisions regarding regional agreements under 
Article 24 of GATT (1994). Even though Article 24 disciplines are notoriously lax in their 
application, they do require that regional agreements cover substantially all trade, and not the 
sector or product specific. A case could be made that Article 20 exceptions which justify trade 
measures that deal with threats to animals, humans or plant life would provide WTO cover 
given damage from global warming. But Article 24 would seemingly mean that carbon 
motivated regional arrangements to be GATT / WTO comparable would best be additions to or 
extensions of existing regional agreements, rather those de novo arrangements. 
 
One clear weakness in using refocused WTO compatible tariff structures reoriented towards 
low carbon products to achieve significant impacts on emissions is that tariff rates on most 
major industrial products are already low in the OECD countries and also bound in preexisting 
WTO commitments. Table 2 reports both bound and MFN applied tariff rates by product by  
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country from WTO Tariff Profiles 2006 data. Higher rates are in clothing and textiles, and (in 
Australia and New Zealand) transport equipment. Also the largest sources of emissions lie in the 
power generation and transportation sectors, which do not correspond to traded products as in 
national tariff schedules.   
In Table 3, data for the EU also suggest that 50% of carbon emissions occur in power 
generation, transportation, steel, aluminum and cement. These sectors then are used to produce 
items which are traded and discrimination in tariff rates among traded goods may yield less 
discrimination among emissions intensities.   
Outside of these sectors, the highest OECD tariffs remain in clothing and textiles, and they 
are also heavily produced outside of the OECD and so production effects of OECD tariffs are 
correspondingly reduced. This all suggests that the room for achieving significant emissions 
reductions using WTO comparable low carbon regional tariff reductions may be limited.  
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Final Bound  0.8 6.7 0.0 9.0 7.0 18.3 41.1 14.4 8.2 10.3 12.6 6.3
Australia
MFN applied  0.0 2.7 0.0 1.8 3.4 6.8 15.4 5.6 3.0 3.0 6.2 1.4
Final Bound  1.2 2.7 6.9 4.4 1.4 10.6 17.2 7.6 3.4 4.3 5.6 4.0
Canada 
MFN applied  1.0 1.7 2.7 2.8 1.1 6.9 17.0 5.6 1.5 2.4 5.8 2.8
Final Bound  11.2 2.0 2.0 4.6 0.9 6.5 11.5 4.2 1.7 2.4 4.1 2.5
EU 
MFN applied  10.3 1.9 2.7 4.6 1.1 6.6 11.5 4.2 1.7 2.5 4.1 2.4
Final Bound  5.0 1.0 76.1 2.0 0.9 5.4 9.2 17.7 0.0 0.2 0.0 1.0
Japan 
MFN applied  5.7 1.0 0.7 2.5 0.9 5.5 9.2 15.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 1.1
Final Bound  15.0 7.6 12.3 5.8 2.8 15.9 28.3 12.2 9.5 9.0 8.2 10.1
Korea 
MFN applied  16.1 4.8 5.1 5.8 2.4 9.2 12.6 7.9 6.0 6.0 5.4 6.4
Final Bound  1.7 8.6 2.9 4.1 4.9 10.5 32.6 16.5 15.1 11.4 15.6 10.2 New 
Zealand MFN applied  0.6 2.2 0.3 1.0 1.6 3.0 16.2 4.8 4.1 3.4 4.6 2.3
Final Bound  1.2 1.7 7.3 2.9 0.4 7.7 11.4 4.6 1.2 1.6 3.1 2.2
USA 
MFN applied  1.1 1.7 2.1 2.8 0.4 7.9 11.5 4.3 1.2 1.7 3.1 2.1
Source: World Tariff Profiles 2006, WTO 2007.  
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In the Doha Round WTO negotiations, there has been a side negotiation underway on tariff 
liberalization in environmentally sensitive goods and services (ICTSD, 2007). It has, however, 
become embodied in definition of problems as to what constitutes an environmental goods or 
service. An indicative list of 43 such goods (including windmills and bicycles) from the US has 
circulated in Geneva. This has, however been opposed by several countries for not including 
key potential exports by them of what they regard as environmental goods. A key area is ethanol 
exports by Brazil to the EU for which the effective tariff rate on what the EU regard as in 
agricultural good not an environmental good is around 70%. This case highlights the 
definitional problems as to what environmental goods and services actually are. In the later 
stages of the Doha negotiations, Brazil went so far as to suggest a request and offer basic 
negotiation on nomenclature as a way of reaching agreements on definition of such goods 
(Mahesh, 2004). 
Table 4 reports World Bank data on maximum and applied tariff rates on the same 43 select 
climate friendly product and technologies across both high and low income countries. 
High-income WTO members already have low tariff rates on these items, and while low and 
middle income WTO members higher tariff rates on these goods and technologies and these is 
little trade in these among them. Trade liberalization in developing countries will give countries 
access to these technologies and reduce global emissions, but the starting point in terms of trade 
volumes is low. Tariff reductions on products that are inputs to low carbon process will also 
contribute to emissions reductions, but again among developing countries, such trade is small. 
There are isolated large barriers which offer potentially larger effects, such as in Brazil, as data 
from Wikipedia, where bioelectricity from sugarcane currently accounts for 4% of Brazilian 
electricity use and is expected to reach 15% by 2015 and the EU tariff on ethanol is high. As 
noted above, this has been excluded from the WTO EGS negotiation on the grounds that 
sugarcane is an agricultural product, not an environmental good and has been sharply contested 
by Brazil. 
 That large portion of emissions are associated with a small number of high emitting 
sectors where outputs are little traded directly, but traded indirectly embodied in produced 
goods is a father central difficulty for carbon motivated regional trade initiatives. Table 3 
reports data on emissions by sector by country that suggest that power generation is the largest 
of these (accounting for nearly 50% of emissions in some OECD countries), and   
transportation is the second (25% in some countries),also iron and steel, and extractive 
industries. Also, as Table 1 suggests, among traded higher stage fabricated products, the 
differences in direct emissions intensity are relatively small compared the differences across 
production of basic commodities (electricity, steel, etc). This seemingly greatly weakens the 
potential impacts on emissions of any WTO compatible tariff based measures.  
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Table3: Direct CO2 Emissions from Fossil Fuel Combustion by Sector as a Percentage of Total Emissions by Country (1995) 
(% of country totals) 
 
INDUSTRY    AUSTRA
LIA    CANADA CZECH 






CE   
GERMA
NY   
GREE
CE   
HUNG




Agriculture, etc.  1.4   2.0   2.6   3.9   3.1  2.4   0.7   3.8  2.9   2.0   3.0  2.2  
Mining, Extraction, 
Refining  6.6   12.7   1.8   4.0   3.1  5.4   3.6   3.6  3.8   4.7   5.1  2.9  
Food, Beverages, Tobacco  1.1   0.0   1.3   2.7   1.1  2.1   1.0   1.3  1.5   1.2   0.7  1.1  
Textiles, Leather, Footwear  0.2   0.0   1.0   0.1   0.2  0.4   0.2   0.5  0.2   0.9   0.6  1.4  
Wood, Products   
of wood, & Cork  0.1   0.2   0.2   0.1   0.7  0.0   0.1   0.0  0.1   0.0   0.0  0.1  
Pulp, Paper Printing, 
 and  Publishing  0.6   2.4   0.9   0.3   5.3  1.3   0.9   0.3  0.4   0.9   1.4  1.1  
Chemicals  1.5   4.2   1.7   0.6   2.0  5.8   4.3   0.5  3.8   5.8   3.5  5.6  
Other Non-Metallic   
Mineral   1.8   0.8   2.7   2.7   3.7  2.4   2.4   6.1  2.6   4.8   3.2  4.7  
Iron & Steel  3.6   2.9   8.9   0.2   6.7  5.5   3.7   0.5  3.5   3.4   6.5  1.3  
Non-Ferrous Metals  4.6   0.6   0.1   0.  0  0.2  0.5   0.3   1.6  0.4   0.2   0.6  0.2  
Other Metal Products, 
Machinery Eqpt  0.2   0.0   1.3   0.7   0.5  1.3   0.8   0.0  0.7   1.6   0.8  0.7  
Motor Vehicles, Trains, 
Ships Planes.  0.1   0.0   0.5   0.1   0.2  0.1   0.4   0.0  0.2   0.0   0.0  0.4  
Other Manufacturing   
& Recycling  0.0   4.2   8.8   0.4   0.1  2.2   0.5   1.1  0.1   0.5   3.2  2.8  
Electricity, Gas, Water  46.4   21.5   41.8   51.9  36.0  5.4   32.3  49.8  41.0  25.7  28.6  20.9 
Total Industrial 
Production   68.3   51.5   73.5   67.8  62.9  34.6   51.4  69.0  61.3  51.8  57.4  45.3 
Construction  1.1   0.6   1.6   0.8   0.2  0.7   0.3   0.1  0.1   0.1   1.5  0.3  
Transport Use    24.1   29.3   6.0   20.5  20.3  35.4   19.5  23.1  14.8  26.1  21.4  21.5 
Non-Transport Services    1.2   7.6   2.0   1.6   0.1  9.3   5.7   0.8  7.1   0.0   6.0  12.4 
Non-Transport Residential    2.3   8.9   9.0   8.5   11.0  14.8   14.8  6.3  14.4  17.0  6.6  5.7  
Auto-Producers   
Non-Specified    1.7   0.9   5.3   0.7   4.3  4.5   6.7   0.6  1.1   4.3   6.3  12.5 
Other Non-Specified  1.4 1.2 2.5  0.1  1.2  0.7  1.7 0.2 1.3 0.8  0.9 2.3 
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Agriculture, etc.  5.4   2.6   6.0   4.0   2.3   2.8   0.5  0.9   5.3   0.2   2.7   1.4   1.9  
Mining, Extraction, 
Refining  9.2   5.1   36.4   4.2   5.9   4.3   7.3  5.0   8.5   3.0   5.1   3.3   5.6  
Food, Beverages, 
Tobacco  1.8   0.3   1.4   2.4   1.9   1.5   1.4  1.0   1.7   0.4   2.0   0.5   1.1  
Textiles, Leather, 
Footwear  0.2   0.0   0.1   0.7   0.8   0.2   0.4  0.2   0.6   0.9   1.3   0.0   0.6  
Wood, Products   
of wood, & Cork  0.0   0.0   0.2   0.3   0.1   0.2   0.0  0.2   0.0   0.0   0.2   0.1   0.1  
Pulp, Paper Printing, 
 and  Publishing  0.5   0.0   2.0   0.7   1.1   3.2   1.0  0.9   1.5   0.8   1.0   0.0   0.9  
Chemicals  8.6   7.7   4.3   3.6   4.7   3.8   3.5  3.2   6.4   5.3   6.2   2.7   4.5  
Other Non-Metallic   
Mineral   1.0   0.0   3.4   3.2   5.0   2.2   1.1  1.1   3.7   3.9   8.5   0.9   3.0  
Iron  &  Steel  3.5   5.8   7.3   5.2   3.7   5.4   2.9  1.6   8.8   10.6  9.3   6.5   4.7  
Non-Ferrous Metals  0.1   0.0   0.6   0.4   0.4   0.5   0.3  0.4   2.2   0.1   0.9   0.7   0.5  
Other Metal Products, 
Machinery Eqpt  0.6   0.0   0.4   0.9   0.5   0.8   0.6  0.5   0.0   0.2   1.9   0.4   0.7  
Motor Vehicles, 
Trains, Ships Planes.  0.1   0.0   0.2   0.4   0.4   0.5   0.5  0.3   0.0   0.0   0.5   0.0   0.2  
Other Manufacturing   
& Recycling 
0.2   12.6   0.1   0.0   0.6   1.1   1.6  0.2   1.9   8.2   1.0   0.4   0.4  
Electricity, Gas, 
Water  26.4    11.3    0.6    47.5    28.9    15.0    32.8  36.7   3.8   40.2  38.6 34.7    32.1 
Total Industrial 
Production   57.7   45.5   62.7   73.5   56.2   41.6   53.9  52.3   44.4   73.7  79.1  51.8   56.2 
Construction  0.4   1.0   0.3   0.3   0.1   0.0   0.4  0.0   0.0   0.0   0.4   0.2   0.4  
Transport  Use   16.9   43.9   36.6   6.9   31.0   40.5   23.5  29.6   43.2   13.3  5.8   12.7   20.2 
Non-Transport 
Services   
1.6   5.2   3.0   2.0   2.2   7.1   4.6  4.2   1.2   0.0   2.0   0.6   3.2  
Non-Transport 
Residential    11.8   1.8   3.0   12.6   5.9   7.9   14.2  6.9   6.4   6.0   9.0   9.3   8.8  
Auto-Producers   
Non-Specified    3.2   1.5   0.8   4.3   3.1   2.0   1.4  5.8   2.6   6.3   0.7   24.2   9.7  
Other Non-Specified  8.4   1.0   -6.3   0.5   1.6   0.8   1.9  1.3   2.3   0.6   2.9   1.1   1.1  
Source: Ahmad N. and A. Wyckoff (2003), “Carbon Dioxide Emissions Embodied in International Trade of Goods”, OECD Science, 
Technology and Industry Working Papers.  
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 Finally and as already noted in Table 1, we return to the point that there are considerably 
larger differences in emissions intensities between countries (and even across regions within 
countries) than there are across sectors or products produced within countries. As we note above, 
this suggests potentially sharp differentiation in tariff rates across supplying countries for any 
use of trade policies that is to be effective in reducing carbon emissions. Accompanying these 
would be considerably more complex rules of origin than currently used in existing regional 
agreements.   
The central problems however ,with this latter approach is that it is diametrically opposed 
to the central principle of MFN/ non discrimination in Article 1 of GATT 1944, the key element 
in the charter of the WTO. As such, there is seemingly a central and critical conflict between the 
idea of using non discrimination (MFN) in trade arrangements in the WTO to spread the 
benefits of any bilaterally negotiated trade liberalization more broadly across all countries, and 
more costly country discrimination in trade, as an objective of global environmental policies. If 
the latter aim to internalize external effects, and if the country of the original source of damage 
associated with the externality differs greatly across countries, seemingly on global efficiency 
grounds discrimination by country seems called for. Remedying location varying externalities 
through geographically discriminatory measures thus might seem logical to environmental 
economists, but the idea also strikes at the heart of the post war GATT/WTO based trading 
system which is so close to the heart of trade economists. 
    Turning to group wide uses of trade policies to support emissions reductions initiatives, 
there are a variety of potential forms that carbon motivated free trade area or regional 
arrangements could be. These range across the different forms and permutations. 
One idea which has attracted recent attention is that either existing or newly negotiated 
bilateral or regional trade arrangements directly reflect emissions reduction objectives shared by 
pairs of countries or groups of countries in the agreements reached. A recent Chatham House 
study (Lee & Froggatt, 2007) proposed a version of this idea, when discussing a possible EU- 
China bilateral agreement. The Chatham House explicitly suggests the use of trade preferences 
in favor of low carbon products in such an agreement, with the objective of lowering emissions 
from the two participating entities by encouraging switching of both production and 
consumption in the two countries into relatively low carbon products. Whether or not global 
emissions necessarily fall as a result of such agreements is, however, not clear as it depends on 
the relative emissions intensities of productions inside and outside of the regional agreement 
countries. Some existing free trade agreements already have added environmental context, such 
as in US-Chile free trade agreements, which include elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers 
on environmental goods and services (USTR,2003) , and NAFTA which has special dispute 
settlement rules for environmental cases, and establishes a trilateral US-Mexico-Canada  
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commission to evaluate environmental impacts of the agreement. The latter arrangements are 
not climate change focused however.   
This discussion of carbon free trade agreements therefore focuses on possible ways in 
which regional trade agreements can contribute directly to emissions reduction through changes 
in the composition of trade among member countries in such agreements. They would 
potentially depart from classical free trade areas as simply zero tariffs within a geographical 
zone, by using product specific arrangements which embody larger or tiered preferences toward 
low carbon products as a way of encouraging both consumption and productions switching 
towards low emission products. 
It is generally thought that these types of carbon free trade agreements would be 
relatively easy to implement as an overlay on existing customs unions/ free trade areas since 
they would basically depart from conventional arrangements only by using product specific low 
carbon tariff rates. There is the added issue of potential new and more complex rules of origin 
which would be involved, but such agreements are believed to be easily negotiable. It is their 
effectiveness that is the more central issue. 
 
Table 4: World Bank Data on Maximum and Applied Tariff Rates   
on 43 Climate-Friendly Products and Technologies   
Low- and Middle-Income 
WTO Members  High -Income WTO Members 
HS 













PVC or polyethylene plastic membrane systems to 
provide and impermeable base for landfill sites and 
protect soil under gas stations , oil refineries, etc. from 
infiltration by pollutants and for reinforcement of soil 
30 13 15  5 
560314 
Nonwovens, whether or not impregnated, coated, 
covered or laminated: of manmade filaments; weighing 
more than 150 g/m2 for filtering wastewater 
33 14 16  4 
701931  Thin sheet (voiles), webs, mats, mattresses, boards, 
and similar nonwoven products.    34 13 17  4 
730820  Towers and lattice masts for wind turbine  28  10  16  3 
730900  Containers of any material, of any form, for liquid or 
solid waste, including for municipal or dangerous waste  32 12 17  4 
732111 
Solar driven stoves, ranges, grates, cookers(including 
those with subsidiary boilers for central heating), 
barbecues, braziers, gas-rings, plate warmers and 
similar non-electric domestic appliances and parts 
thereof, of iron or steel 
36 18 15  5 
732190 
Stoves, ranges, grates, cookers(including those with 
subsidiary boilers for central heating),barbecues, 
braziers, gas-rings, plate warmers and similar 
non-electric domestic appliances, and parts thereof, of 
iron or steel-Parts 
36 14 15  4 
732490 Water  saving  shower  28  19  17  4 
761100  Aluminum reservoirs, tanks, vats and similar containers 
for any material (specifically tanks or vats for anaerobic  31 11 16  4  
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digesters for biomass gasification) 
761290  Containers of any material, of any form, for liquid or 
solid waste, including for municipal or dangerous waste  31 13 14  4 
840219  Vapor generating boilers, not elsewhere specified or 
included hybrid  24 5 15 4 
840290  Super-heated water boilers and parts of steam 
generating boilers  21 5 15 4 
840410  Auxiliary plant for steam, water, and central boiler  25  5  15  3 
840490  Parts for auxiliary plant for boilers, condensers for 
steam, vapor power unit  25 4 16 3 
840510  Producer gas or water gas generators, wit or without 
purifiers  24 5 13 2 
840681  Turbines, steam and other vapor, over 40 MW, not 
elsewhere specified or included  28 5 13 3 
841011  Hydraulic turbines and water wheels of a power not 
exceeding 1,000 kW  24 4 15 3 
841090  Hydraulic turbines and water wheels of; parts, including 
regulators  24 4 15 3 
841181  Gas turbines of a power not exceeding 5,000 kW  20  5  13  2 
841182  Gas turbines of a power exceeding 5,000kW  20  5  13  2 
841581 
Compression type refrigerating, freezing equipment 
incorporating a valve for reversal of cooling/heating 
cycles (reverse heat pumps) 
29 13 16  4 
841861 
Compression type refrigerating, freezing equipment 
incorporating a valve for reversal of cooling/heating 
cycles (reverse heat pumps) 
21 7 17 4 
841869 
Compression type refrigerating, freezing equipment 
incorporating a valve for reversal of cooling/heating 
cycles (reverse heat pumps) 
21 7 16 4 
841919  Solar boiler (water heater)  27  10  17  4 
841940  Distilling or rectifying plant  23  4  15  3 
841950  Solar collector and solar sy6stem controller, heat 
exchanger  24 5 15 3 
841989 
Machinery, 8plant or laboratory equipment whether or 
not electrically heated (excluding furnaces, ovens etc.) 
for treatment of materials by a process involving a 
change of temperature such a heating, cooking, 
roasting, distilling, rectifying, sterilizing, steaming, 
drying, evaporating, vaporizing, condensing or cooling. 
25 6 12 3 
841990  Medical, surgical or laboratory stabilizers  24  6  12  2 
848340  Gears and gearing and other speed changers 
(specifically for wind turbines)  22 8 16 3 
848360  Clutches and universal joints (specifically for wind 
turbines)  23 9 15 3 
850161  AC generators not exceeding 75kVA (specifically for all 
electricity generating renewable energy plants)  27 7 15 3 
850162 
AC generators exceeding 75kVA but not 375 
kVA(specifically for all electricity generating renewable 
energy plants) 
26 7 16 3 
850163 
AC generators exceeding 75kVA but not 375 
kVA(specifically for all electricity generating renewable 
energy plants) 
26 5 16 3 
850164  AC generators exceeding 750kVA (specifically for all 
electricity generating renewable energy plants)  28 5 16 3 
850231  Electric generating sets and rotary converters; 
wind-powered  26 5 16 3 
850680 
Fuel cells use hydrogen or hydrogen-containing fuels 
such as methane to produce an electric current, through 
an electrochemical process rather than combustion 
25 18 16  3 
850720  Other lead acid accumulators  24  16  16  5 
853710 Photovoltaic  system  controller  26  10  17  3 
854140  Photosensitive  semiconductor devices, including  21  4  9  1  
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photovoltaic cells whether or not assembled in modules 
or made up into panels; light-emitting diodes 
900190  Mirrors of other that glass (specifically for solar 
concentrator systems)  30 7 16 3 
900290  Mirrors of glass (specifically for solar concentrator 
systems)  29 12 18  3 
903210 Thermostats  33  7  14  3 
903220 Manostats  33  6  13  2 
 
Source: World Bank (2008) International Trade and Climate Change, Washington, DC 
 
A second type of carbon free trade agreement would go farther by also embodying offsets 
to the perceived anti-competitive effects potentially generated against domestic producers from 
significant carbon emissions reductions .The issue is the cost increases they face from own 
country emissions reductions relative to smaller impacts abroad if others do not match the 
emissions reductions. This issue has come up centrally in the European debate on unilateral 
European emissions reductions, and is further discussed in Ismer & Neuhoff (2007), and 
Lockwood & Whalley(2008).  
In the EU case it has been not only the prospective use of carbon emission reductions in a 
single region not matched by other countries but also the prospective changes post 2012 in the 
European Carbon Emissions Trading Scheme with less dependence on cap and trade 
arrangements and more reliance on  auctioning of emissions quotas. Under a cap and trade 
scheme, existing products receive agreed allocations of quota and must buy more. Under quota 
auctions they must buy the full amount. A related concern in such arrangements is also to 
reduce carbon leakage effects through potentially increased emissions by non participants.   
The offsets proposals take the form of border tax adjustments and as noted by Lockwood 
& Whalley (2008) there are two ways those that have been advanced to offset the leakage and 
cost effects involved. One is that imported goods would be taxed at the border in ways which 
reflect the cost of the emissions trading were they to be produced in the home market they are 
entering. This would involve border tax adjustments between countries. Another alternative 
approach to BTAs which has been suggested is to use tax equivalents based on enforcement of 
emissions allowance trading for all importers. US debate has focused on this approach. Under 
this, any importer of products would need to buy emissions rights domestically to meet required 
offsets, and exporters could sell some of their emissions permits acquired for production to gain 
offset.  
These schemes however, face a number of issues. At a conceptual level, a key issue is 
whether such border adjustments would have the offsetting effects which are claimed in the 
proposals made. It has long been argued  in analytical literature on border tax adjustments at 
the time of the introduction of    the value added tax in Europe going back to the late 1960’s and  
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early 1970’s, that in a uniform tax case no effects on trade will be generated from such 
measures. If imports are taxed while exports receive equal rate tax rebates, there would be no 
real effects from such measures because they would simply induce changes in exchange rates or 
price levels which would offset the border tax adjustments. Put another way, a border tax 
adjustment is simply a movement between a consumption  to a production based tax and vice 
versa and has no effects on relative prices and hence no real effects on trade or production. 
Hence there is a need to clearly specify what the potential offset effects actually might be in 
practice from such arrangements. 
Also, and as emphasized in Lockwood & Whalley (2008), the motivation for such border 
measures should be seen as a separate matter from the impacts of the measures themselves. 
Thus, the motivation for the use of border measures should be put on one side once the impacts 
of such measures become the issue since their impacts on trade are independently of the 
motivation. As Lockwood & Whalley (2008) also note, such border adjustments could also be 
rationalized based on differences in labor costs, labor standards or other policy elements.   
There is also the issue of the administrative complexity of implementing such measures. 
Calculating the carbon content involved in products is difficult. Not only is there the direct 
carbon content of production involved, but also the indirect carbon content – the amount of 
carbon involved in producing the steel which goes into a car. Equally problematic is that 
international sourcing involves products which have components with origins in multiple 
countries. Indeed, in many production processes within countries component origins are often 
not kept track of in detailed ways and this makes the calculation of carbon content even more 
difficult. Rules of origin associated with such arrangements would thus be complex and 
considerably more difficult to administer than rules of origin in conventional trade 
arrangements.  
On top of these complications, the form of such arrangements is a further issue since 
different countries may be adopting emission reductions commitments at different speeds and in 
different ways. Country discrimination in such agreements becomes difficult to calculate and 
administer if they involve groups of countries who are going farther and faster than other 
countries in their emissions reduction commitments. And if the border tax adjustments being 
discussed in the EU are instead applied by groups of countries, the structure would no longer be 
one of complete free trade between integrating members and common external barriers towards 
third parties as in a customs union or a free trade area. Instead a gradation of trade arrangements, 
both among members within countries and members outside would seemingly be needed .These 
would involve differentiated trade preferences based on different carbon reduction 
commitments and varying carbon contents of production by county. These arrangements thus 
would face many difficulties in implementation, which would also complicate assessment of  
- 21 - 
their impacts and add to administrative complexity. 
A third type of carbon free trade arrangement would revolve around  groups  of  countries 
who jointly commit to emissions reductions ,but who either threaten or actually discriminatorily 
use trade arrangements as a penalty mechanism against non-participants to force them to join in 
the emissions reduction. As mentioned earlier, this is the structure embodied in the 1987 
Montreal Protocol, which involves the use of trade barrier threats to force non signatories to the 
agreement to eliminate use and production of hydro carbons and other ozone depleting 
substances to join the original agreements struck by a sub coalition of countries (Werksman, 
2006).  
Here, there are difficulties with the potential size of penalties which might be required, as 
well as that their penalties would likely violate tariff bindings in the WTO, This would 
seemingly inevitably occur in some arrangements if the threats were to be strong enough to 
enforce compliance by heavy and large emitters such as India and China. Under this type of 
carbon free trade agreement the conflicts between environmental arrangements using trade 
policies and the existing WTO commitments embodied in preexisting trade policy structure 
would be greatly elevated. 
Who would be involved in such arrangements is also a central issue, especially as the 
major differences in global environmental negotiations is now lying between the OECD and the 
rapidly growing large population low wage economies (Brazil, China, and India) who took no 
commitments under Kyoto and who were granted special treatment under the principle of 
Common But Differentiated Responsibilities. Lack of satisfactory progress in global climate 
change negotiations could thus well fuel the pressures for trade action across the same decade. 
This then indicates the types of trade arrangements that might be involved in the form of 
regional trade initiatives undertaken in the name of supporting significant carbon emission 
reductions. They range from WTO compatible low carbon product trade pacts, to country 
discrimination that would undermine the MFN non discrimination in the WTO, and from 
cooperative offset mechanism to unilateral commitments. Trade policy sanctions by groups of 
countries or parties in agreements could also be used to force compliance by non participants. 
The growing links between global climate change and trade arrangements would seemingly 
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4. Potential Impacts and Systemic Implications of Carbon 
Motivated Trade Policies 
What are potential impacts of carbon motivated trade policies on emission levels, and how 
significant might they be? What is the size of the potential barriers involved? Are there potential 
reversals of trade flows and what would be the impact generally on global trade flows? Would 
the trade threats involved be strong enough to induce environmental compliance by major 
entities? And how might the trading system evolve under a scenario of growing severity of 
climate related damage?   
On the emissions front, the general presumption as noted earlier is that growth has 
seemingly much more impact on emission levels than trade, and it is the level of trade more so 
than the composition of trade that matters. For carbon free trade areas of the first type, 
involving tariff preferences towards low carbon intensive products, there could be some 
reductions in emission levels, but these effects would likely to be small. And even the sign of 
the effect is ambiguous.   
An important variable in determining the emissions outcome is the relative emissions 
intensity of production in these industrialized products (characterized as low carbon) across 
third countries outside of the agreement and those countries within the agreement. If third 
countries have lower emissions levels in production then members of the regional agreement 
with trade diversion effect away from third parties , it is possible that emissions levels could rise 
as a result of the agreement, even though low carbon trade within there countries (and 
consumption and production ) is stimulated. If more emission intensive production inside the 
region displaces lower emission intensive production outside the region, emission levels will 
still be high, even though there is more consumption and production globally of low carbon 
intensive productions. Hence impacts of regional agreements on emissions are not clear. 
The effects on emissions can also be influenced by the reactions of those outside the 
agreement. If third countries with lower emission intensive production  join the carbon 
motivated FTA to gain market access, or relocate plants from outside the region to inside the 
region, and in the process  produce with lower emissions levels  than original members and 
regain market share, emission levels can fall due to these effects. Thus investment diversion 
effects can make carbon motivated FTA’s emissions reducing. The net effect of all these 
possibilities will require numerical simulation analysis to get exact estimates of possible net 
effects, or export decomposition to separate out FTA influences from other changes impacting 
trading relationship.   
With the second form of regional agreement where there is use of border measures for 
offsets to anti-competitive effects on domestic producers, again the relative emissions intensity  
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of production inside and outside the region will be important assuming that real effects occur. 
Lockwood & Whalley(2008) have recently discussed carbon motivated border tax adjustments 
in light of earlier border tax literature on the value added tax in Europe in the 1960s (see Krauss 
& Johnson(1972), Shibata(1967), and Whalley (1979)).  They note the earlier emphasis on 
neutrality  of border tax changes and discuss scenarios under which similar outcomes could 
occur with carbon motivated border adjustments. They highlight the need to separately consider 
price level and relative price effect like more broadly border adjustments occur.   
Similar considerations come into play in appraising the possible effects of threat driven 
agreements. Again strategic response matters. If countries with higher emission levels are not 
induced to join the agreement then increases in emissions can occur. One also needs to consider 
the combined effects of the three kinds of carbon motivated regional trade agreements, when 
carbons FTAs are designed as penalty mechanisms. If they induce high emission countries to 
join the agreement, then they can tend to reduce global emissions. 
Finally, there is also the size of the threatened measures involved under the third type of 
regional carbon motivated trade measures that might be needed to induce compliance. There has 
been speculation that for larger economies such as India and China, who are rapidly growing 
and have large internal markets, that the potential costs for them of meeting global 
environmental commitments requested of them could be so large as to dissuade them from 
participating in environmental agreement and even trade threats pushing them all the way to 
autarky might not be sufficient to generate their compliance. The severity of the threats 
involved will depend on the severity of the anticipated damage from elevated global warming, 
but even if very high trade barriers were in effective to induce compliance, conflicts would 
inherently intensify on other fronts.   
If these forms of carbon motivated regional trade agreements grow over time (say over the 
next 5-10 years) and if the potential severity of global warming issues is viewed as worsening, 
trade measures associated with the environmental component of global trade arrangements will 
also likely grow in profile. Were that to happen, carbon regional agreements could potentially 
involve large barriers against parties outside them. If carbon prices in the region of 50 or 100 – 
200 dollars/ tonne were needed to appropriately price out the global externalities associated 
with carbon, the barriers involved and also the potential competitive offsets involved with 
border measures could be very large. The same would be true for threats needed to induce 
compliance.  
As a result, progressively over time, the environmentally based component of global trade 
arrangements could come to dominate the conventional component of trade policy in terms of 
relative size. In turn, these heightened trade barriers would increasingly likely generate 
violations of tariff bindings committed to the WTO under Article 2 and generate a series of  
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dispute settlement cases in the WTO. The prospect that the levels of the environmentally 
motivated trade protection could increase sharply over the next few decades is a major difficulty 
for the WTO rule based trading system, with substantial pressure potentially being placed on the 
trading system from the quarters in the years ahead. 
Another set of issues are the potential trade impacts of such trade policy initiatives. Results 
from an earlier modeling piece by Piggott, Whalley & Wigle (1993) suggested that significant 
global emissions commitments could have the effect of sharply reducing global trade volumes. 
This reflected  the relative price effects between  energy and other  inputs feeding through  
the global economy onto    the price of manufactures and from these to nontrade services given 
that  manufactures are sharply more energy intensive than services. Some of their model 
simulations showed reductions in the level of world trade in the region of 25% from significant 
carbon motivated initiatives and their results suggested that global climate initiatives potentially 
have large impacts on global trade flows. They would operate in the opposite direction to the 
trade effects of liberalization that have driven the system under the GATT and the WTO since 
1947. 
Along with changes in trade patterns, the modeling work by Piggott et al also suggested that 
some large economies, such as Japan which are large exporters of manufactures could become 
net importers of manufactures due to energy price effects. Their results thus suggest that there 
could be major impacts on global trading patterns from climate actions taken globally. Not only 
are trade impacts from high barriers involved, but the impacts applied to global trade flows 
themselves could reverse the direction of trade in some cases. 
            A further potential effect of climate motivated trade policy is to fuel linkage of trade 
policy to other areas and objectives. Since the 1940’s trade policy has been viewed generally as 
a direct and separate policy subsystem, whose objectives were in part to achieve global 
cooperation to prevent retaliatory closing of the global economy as in the 1930’s, and to fuel 
global growth by progressive move to policy. Only have recently with the debate in the WTO 
on trade and environment has linkage to non trade areas arisen in a significant way. With 
climate motivated areas of trade policies, similar issues and uses of trade policy potentially arise 
in many other areas. Trade policies could be stimulated to offset competitive disadvantages 
from minimum wages, social programs, tax policies, equality regimes, and many other forms of 
initiatives. They would be used by regions to force other countries to adopt policies they wish to 
perceive.  Uses of trade policy for emissions reduction thus potentially sharply elevate the 
strategic interactions among countries, and the actual impacts of polices introduced need to be 
separated from their motivation.   
This discussion of carbon motivated trade policies adopted either unilaterally or by groups 
of countries also raises issues as to what the future might be for the trading system in a world  
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where both climate change concerns and physical manifestation of climate change progressively 
grow over time. Can the GATT/WTO based system of the post war years as we have come to 
know it survive and continue to operate? 
We see the future evolution of the trading system as one where potentially the 
environmentally motivated component of trade arrangements increasingly acts as an overlay on 
conventional trade arrangements involving rules and disciplines under the WTO along with 
growing and spreading regional trade agreements. The growths of the latter have been 
extensively discussed in recent literature (Whalley, 2008a). Environmental agreements, in turn, 
are likely to grow in significance and trade interventions motivated by new climate agreements 
will grow. Under a severe global warming scenario climate related considerations could 
eventually come to dominate the evolution of the trading system.   
In this world, linkage and the interface of trade and the climate then will likely be different 
from that which has the focus of debate in the WTO for the last 10 – 15 years. The focus has 
largely been on whether or not countries should have rights to use trade restricting measures on 
environmental grounds, not the trade implications of environmental measures, most of which 
would arise from developments operates outside of the framework of the WTO. These 
developments would trigger disputes within the WTO for violation of tariff bindings, and in this 
way could become dominant part of global trade debate, but the WTO could not directly control 
the underlying climate related actions. 
If this trend was to occur (and it would likely depend on the severity of climate changes) 
the prospect would be for global environmental negotiations to progressively grow in profile to 
the point that they dominated trade negotiations in perceived significance. Trade policy 
bargaining would then more and more have to take into account links to global environmental 
negotiations to the point that the present WTO becomes a global bargaining entity which 
progressively moves beyond trade. As evolution from the WTO to a World Bargaining 
Organization (as discussed in Whalley (2008b)) could be the outcome. 
The size and speed of institutional modification that might be associated with more severe 
global warming scenarios suggests major global change ahead. Increased use of carbon 
motivated trade policies may be only one manifestation. The post Doha WTO might evolve as 
an entity heavily dealing with trade linkage to higher profile climate change. Negotiation in the 
WTO both in tariff barriers and in MFN could come under pressure to resuspend. The pressure 
to formally link trade negotiations to higher profile global environmental negotiations could 
grow.  
  
- 26 - 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Ahmad N. & A. Wyckoff (2003) “Carbon Dioxide Emissions Embodied in International Trade 
of Goods”, OECD Science, Technology and Industry Working Papers, 2003/15, OECD 
Publishing. doi:10.1787/421482436815. 
 
Cosbey A. & R.Tarasofsky (2007)  “Climate Change, Competitiveness and Trade” Chatham 
House Report. 
 
Dong Y. & J. Whalley (2008) “Carbon Motivated Regional Trade Arrangements: Analytics and 
Simulations” (unpublished). 
 
Hufbauer G. C. (1996) Fundamental Tax Reform and Border Tax Adjustments,   
Washington D.C. 
 
ICTSD (2007) “Trade in Environmental Goods and Services and Sustainable Development”, 
ICTSD policy discussion paper. 
 
Ismer R. & K. Neuhoff (2007) “Border Tax Adjustment: A Feasible Way to Support Stringent 
Emission Trading” European Journal of Law and Economics 24, pp 137-164. 
 
Jha V. (2008) “Trade in Environmental Goods: A Reality Check.” Bridges Trade BioRes 
Review, Issue 3. 
 
Johnson H. & M .Drauss (1970)“Border Taxs, Border Tax Adjustments, Comparative 
Advantage, and the Balance of Payments.” T he Canadian Journal of Economics. 3(4), 
pp.595-602. 
 
Kejun J. A. Cosbey, and D.Murphy, (2008)“Embodied Carbon in Traded Goods”, paper 
presented at “Trade and Climate Change Seminar” June 18–20, 2008，Copenhagen, 
Denmark. 
 
Krauss M.B. & H.G. Johnson(1972) “The Theory of Tax Incidence: A Diagrammatic Analysis” 
Economica, Vol.39(156), pp 357-82. 
 
Lee B. ,A. Froggatt and et al (2007) “Changing Climates: Interdependencies on Energy and 
Climate Security for China and Europe”  Chatham  House  Report. 
 
Lockwood B. & J. Whalley (2008) “Carbon Motivated Border Tax Adjustments: Old Wine in 
Green Bottles?” NBER Working Paper No. 14025 , Issued in May 2008 . 
 
Mahesh S. (2004) “Environmental Goods and Services Negotiations: Challenges 
and Opportunities” Presentation in “WTO Workshop on Environmental Goods: 
Para 31 (iii) of the DDA”, Geneva. 
 
Mccorriston S. & I.M.Sheldon, (2005)“Market Access and WTO Border Tax Adjustments for 
Enviromental Excise Taxes under Imperfect Competition.”Journal of Public Economic 
Theory,7(4), pp.579-592. 
 
Piggott J., J .Whalley, and R.Wigle,(1993) “How Large are the Incentives to Join Subglobal 
Carbon-Reduction Initiatives?”,Journal of Policy Modeling, 15(5-6), pp473-490. 
  
- 27 - 
Shibata H.(1967) “The Theory of Economic Unions: A Comparative Analysis of Customs 
Unions, Free Trade Areas, and Tax Unions” in : C.S. Shoup, ed., Fiscal Harmonization in 
Common Markets, Vol.I, Theory, Columbia University Press, New York. 
 
Tilford S. (2007),“How to Make EU Emissions Trading a Success.” Centre for European 
Reform. 
 
UNFCCC (2007), “Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the 
Convention”. 
 




Viner  J.  (1950)  The Customs Union Issue, New York: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace. 
 
Walsh S. & J. Whalley (2008) “The Global Negotiating Framework for Climate Change     
Mitigation”,Paper prepared at CESifo conference in Venice July 2008 on European Global 
Environmental Negotiations. 
 
Werksman J.D. (2006) “Trade Sanctions Under the Montreal Protocol”, Review of European 
Community & International Environmental Law ,1(1) pp. 69-72. 
 
Whalley J. (1979) “Uniform Domestic Tax Rates, Trade Distortions and Economic Integration” 
Journal of Public Economics,11(2), pp 213-21. 
 
Whalley J. (2008a)“Recent Regional Agreements: Why so Many, Why so Much Variance in 
Form, Why Coming so Fast, and Where are They Headed?” World Economy, 31(4),pp. 
517-532. 
 
Whalley J. (2008b) “The Coverage, Form and Content of WTO Policy Bargaining Beyond the 
Doha Round” (mimeo).  
 
Wikipedia, “Ethanol Fuel in Brazil” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethanol_fuel_in_Brazil. 
 
World Bank (2008) International Trade and Climate Change, Washington,DC. 
 
WTO (2007) World Tariff Profiles 2006 , WTO Secretariat, Switzerland. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
声明：本报告为非成熟稿件，仅供内部讨论。报告版权为中国社会科学院世界经
济与政治研究所所有，未经许可，不得以任何形式翻版、复制、上网和刊登。
 